

Assessment of the efficiency of Russian response to the implementation of US missile defence deployment concept in Europe

Lyovkin, Igor M.; Shatskaya, Valeria I.

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Lyovkin, I. M., & Shatskaya, V. I. (2012). Assessment of the efficiency of Russian response to the implementation of US missile defence deployment concept in Europe. *Baltic Region*, 1, 28-43. <https://doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2012-1-4>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more information see:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>

ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICIENCY OF RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF US MISSILE DEFENCE DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT IN EUROPE

I. M. Lyovkin
*V. I. Shatskaya**



This article is dedicated to the problems of deployment of the US anti-missile defence system in Eastern Europe. The European system of US missile defence is just one of the components of global US missile defence. This work aims to analyze possible Russia's responses within military and political spheres. The measures proposed are divided into three subgroups: soft, medium and hard depending on the implementation of the adopted missile defence concept by the USA. This research employs the structure-system method and the method of actualization. The authors outline both positive and negative consequences of such actions for the Russian Federation, the USA, eastern European countries and the neighbouring countries, including the Baltic Sea states. The practical significance of this study consists in the proposed and justified responses of the Russian Federation that may serve as a basis for the scenarios of development of international situation and help to forecast the level of tension in Russia-US relations.

Key words: missile defence, Iskander, NATO, concept, aerospace defence

The idea of creation of a new anti-missile defence concept voiced by President George W. Bush in 2001 [19] and the concept of US missile defence deployment in Eastern Europe presented by the Presidential Administration in January 2006 [15] caused severe criticism from the Russian Federation and its alliance partners.

Despite the constant statements of the US Presidential Administration that the deployment of AA radars and an anti-missile defence system in Eastern Europe is by no means a move against the Russian Federation, Russia's gov-

* North-West Institute of Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
57/43 Sredny pr., V.O., St. Petersburg
199178, Russia

Received 11 October 2011

doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2012-1-4

ernment believes that the USA pursues the above-mentioned goal. The defence concept aims to create “the system of non-nuclear means designed to counter ballistic missiles of all ranges — short, medium, intermediate and long” [15, p. 2]. The new anti-ballistic missile defence system (ABM) was originally planned to have the form of a triangle with one angle situated in Eastern Europe and two others in the USA — in Alaska (Fort Greely) and in California (Vanderberg). Anti-ballistic missile defence components would destroy hostile warheads in the terminal phase with the Patriot AD Weapon System. Missile defence facilities deployed in Eastern Europe would be employed for target detection and destroying of ballistic missiles at the ascent and midcourse stages. Space tracking and surveillance system should destroy warheads in the midcourse phase [10]. After Barack Obama and his Administration came to power in 2009, the initial plans of George W. Bush were reconsidered and adjusted. They then provided a basis for the new European NATO Deployment Concept which should be implemented in four stages. The US ABM is to be put into full operational service in 2018 but starts to operate as early as May 2012 [11].

In this connection the Russian Federation is ready to take any possible steps to prevent the escalation of threats to its international security. The range of these steps depends on the actions of the USA on the deployment concept implementation.

In the given case all possible Russian measures in response to the implementation of the US missile defence deployment concept can be grouped according to two spheres — *political* and *military* (Tables 1 and 2).

Political measures are *soft*, *medium* and *hard*, and aimed at developing an alternative to ABM or creating an alliance with Russia’s partner-countries as well as ensuring legality of Russian response to the threat from the Third Site countries.

Military measures provide security to the RF, and are aimed at the development of a collateral defence system and the upgrading of aerospace defence capacity of the Russian Army.

Continued talks and negotiations with the US Administration on inadmissibility of the ABM defence system deployment in Eastern Europe. For better results it is recommended to create a working group that would include, among others: the specialists who had developed the ABM defence of the USSR and the Russian Federation; the developers of the ABM Treaty of 1972; representatives of the Russian Security Council (the Minister of Defence, Directors of External and Internal Intelligence Services; Chief of Defence of the Russian Military, first deputy Minister of Defence, President of the Russian Academy of Science); specialists from the Russian Space Forces (commanding officers of the Space Forces and operative commanding officers of the aerospace defence; head of the Main Centre of Missile Attack Warning; commanding officer of ABM division); representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Minister of Foreign Affairs, one of their Deputies, heads of North American Department, and Security and Disarmament Department); experts in nuclear missiles.

Russian political response to the US missile defence system

| Measures | Prospective opportunities | Negative consequences |
|---|--|--|
| <i>Soft</i> | | |
| Continued talks and negotiations with the US Administration on inadmissibility of the missile defence system deployment in Eastern Europe | All-around consideration of the current situation | Slowing down of construction of the common missile defence system |
| | Detailed elaboration of prospective scenarios / guidelines for negotiations on the missile defence system with the USA | |
| | Drawing up of a draft text of a bilateral or multilateral treaty / agreement | |
| | Permanent informing of military and political administration of the Russian Federation on the course of negotiations, success or failure of the agreed alternative | |
| Elaboration of new prospects on common Russian and US defence system agreement | Display of Russian preparedness to equal cooperation with the USA on the missile defence system | Slow exchange of ideas between Russia and the USA and continued construction of the missile defence system in the Third Site |
| | Evolution of the cooperation between the USA and Russia | |
| | Joint target tracking and surveillance over the possible missile launches by Iran and China | |
| Elaboration of prospects of new agreement with the USA on the missile defence system considering positive experience of ABM Treaty between the USSR and the USA of 1972 | Implementation of Iran nuclear containment policy | Escalating tensions in Russia-Iran and Russia-China relationships |
| | Development of cooperation between the USA and Russia | |
| | Further disarmament | |
| | Further non-proliferation | |
| | Restriction of the USA and Russian potential of missile interception by missile defence systems | |
| | Military-industrial complex cost saving in both countries as opposed to arms race expenditures | Possible escalating tensions in Russia-China relationships |
| | Use of the agreement as an argument against fear of European countries of possible Russian missile threat | |

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| Conducting international hearings on disarmament in general and missile defence system issue in particular with compulsive arrival at corresponding political decisions | <p>Involvement of much more international actors than those responsible for and concerned with the issue</p> <p>Formation of a larger coalition of supporters of a common missile defence system</p> <p>Involvement of countries with neutral attitude (non-members of the above stated organizations) into the creation of a common missile defence system</p> <p>Formulation of international documents obligatory for implementation on disarmament and ABM restriction</p> <p>Rise of probability of the US attitude reconsideration</p> <p>Decreased pace of construction of NATO ABM defence system</p> <p>Drawing attention to non-compliance with / violation of international legislation on disarmament, nuclear weapons, that is the coordination of construction of NATO ABM with possible violations of international law</p> <p>Development of background for the establishment of an international regulatory body for restriction of missile defence systems monitoring</p> <p>Abatement of Iran nuclear-missile threat</p> | Lack of consensus of opinion |
| | <p>Reconciliation of Iran nuclear-missile programme issue by diplomatic means which says for diplomatic victory of Russia</p> <p>Formation of a written agreement with Iran on non-construction of long range ballistic missiles and non-usage of nuclear materials for military purposes</p> <p>Identification of the aim of the Third Site deployment: if Iran promises not to create long range ballistic missiles, what is this system pointed at?</p> <p>In case of ongoing deployment of the US ABM defence, conducting negotiations on Iran joining the Russian coalition is possible</p> <p>Constant calling of world community's attention to the issue of ABM</p> | |
| | <p>Conducting negotiations on the issue of ABM defence in the framework of disarmament and non-proliferation</p> <p>Call to the settlement of ABM issue in the framework of disarmament and non-proliferation</p> <p>Accepting agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation with obligations of parties on ABM</p> <p>Pointing at non-compliance with / violation of disarmament and non-proliferation obligations at the deployment of the Third Site</p> <p>Lack of unilateral disarmament measures</p> | |
| | <p>Awareness campaign on ABM issue in the framework of disarmament and non-proliferation</p> | |
| | | |
| Negotiations with Iran | <p>Reconciliation of Iran nuclear-missile programme issue by diplomatic means which says for diplomatic victory of Russia</p> <p>Formation of a written agreement with Iran on non-construction of long range ballistic missiles and non-usage of nuclear materials for military purposes</p> <p>Identification of the aim of the Third Site deployment: if Iran promises not to create long range ballistic missiles, what is this system pointed at?</p> <p>In case of ongoing deployment of the US ABM defence, conducting negotiations on Iran joining the Russian coalition is possible</p> <p>Constant calling of world community's attention to the issue of ABM</p> | <p>Lack of consensus in talks with Iran</p> <p>Covert development of nuclear-missile programme in Iran</p> |
| | <p>Conducting negotiations on the issue of ABM defence in the framework of disarmament and non-proliferation</p> <p>Call to the settlement of ABM issue in the framework of disarmament and non-proliferation</p> <p>Accepting agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation with obligations of parties on ABM</p> <p>Pointing at non-compliance with / violation of disarmament and non-proliferation obligations at the deployment of the Third Site</p> <p>Lack of unilateral disarmament measures</p> | |
| Coordination of the missile defence system issue with the key issues of disarmament and non-proliferation in the world and in Europe, especially in the EU | <p>Awareness campaign on ABM issue in the framework of disarmament and non-proliferation</p> | <p>Non-compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation obligations by the parties</p> |

| Measures | Potential opportunities | Negative consequences |
|--|--|--|
| Russian agreement to the US proposals on ABM | Construction of common ABM defence | Possible neutralization of Russian nuclear forces Possible neutralization of Chinese nuclear forces Possible cooling in relations of Russia and China Strengthening of Chinese defence capability and elaboration of offensive means |
| <i>Medium</i> | | |
| Convincing Eastern European countries' administrations in negative consequences of the US missile defence deployment within their territories in the course of information and political confrontation | Possible information (and other) impact on the countries of Eastern Europe from outside as well as from the inside Possible rejection of eastern European countries' administrations of the missile defence system deployment within their territories Affording opportunities for public opinion statements within the limits of legislation Display of Russia's capability to resolve the given issue without recourse to extreme measures and confirmation of its world power on the media scene | Possible accusation of the Russian Federation in applying pressure on the countries of Eastern Europe from the part of showing antagonism country |
| Partial Russian agreement to the US proposals on ABM defence | Construction of common ABM defence Consensus on common ABM defence construction | Possible neutralization of Chinese nuclear forces Possible cooling in relations of Russia and China Strengthening of Chinese defence capability and elaboration of offensive means Cooling in Iran-Russia relations |
| <i>Hard</i> | | |
| Adding to defence doctrine of the Russian Federation the provision on possibility of pre-emptive military action against the Third Site of the US missile defence system including the possibility of delivering a tactical nuclear strike | Presenting to the world community the position of the Russian Federation on the issue of the Third Site of the antiballistic missile defence system deployment Offering the states of the Third Site to reassess their ABM-deployment priorities due to the obvious security threat that emerges otherwise Increasing Russian authority in the CIS area, both to attract new allies and reinforce the relationships with the existing ones | Attempts to discredit Russia and represent it as an aggressive state by the West Increased pace of ABM deployment at the Third Site Strengthening of both Russian military defence capacity and that of the Third Site countries Emergence of a threat of provocation and local conflicts |
| Identifying the real US agenda behind the Euro-ABM | | Expansion of existing opposing alliances in size and strengthening of ties between them |
| | | Arms race between Russia and the US |
| | | Threat to Russian external borders (radical) Placing Russia on the US 'axis of evil'. |

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| Forming alliances with the states that support the Russian position against the U. S. deployment of ABM in the countries of the Third Site; cooperation at the international scene on this issue | Creating an alliance for the development of common ABM defence | Possible increase of the military and political stand-off of NATO and SCO in case Russia and China come to a common agreement |
| | Drawing up the plans to deploy SCO ABM on the basis of Russian ABM defence | |
| | Drawing attention to the possibility of cooling down between the US and Russia (including strategic allies of each party) | |
| | Strengthening of Russian relations with other states to increase the level of international security | |
| | Obscured neutralization of Chinese and Russian nuclear forces | |
| | Obstructed US ABM deployment in Japan, India, Taiwan and South Korea | |
| | Allowing the international community to evaluate the negative political and economic consequences of NATO ABM deployment (in case there exists an alliance that will object to such deployment) | |
| | Conducting joint, ABM-related military exercises | |
| | Neutralization of US chief argument for ABM deployment (according to the US, it is built to answer the threats of Iran and China) | |
| | Increasing awareness of ABM-related issues in Russia and other countries | |
| Russia's refusal to accept U. S. ABM proposals | Increasing of Russia's political status in the international scene | Slow-paced exchange of counterarguments between the US and Russia continues; as does the ABM deployment in Europe |
| | Demonstration of strong will in relation to ABM defence | Unilateral ABM-deployment in Eastern Europe |
| | Undertaking measures to protect strategic nuclear forces | Arms race |

Russian military response to the US missile defence system

| Measures | Potential opportunities | Negative consequences |
|---|---|--|
| Development of military and technical proposals on the creation of an alternative ABM with the key role assigned to the Russian military forces | <i>Soft</i> | |
| | Elimination of additional threats for strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation | Possible cooling down in bilateral relations between Russia, China and Iran |
| | Exclusion of Russian territory and its nuclear forces from the control zone | China views the situation as a hostile act designed to undermine its nuclear status or as an alliance formed against China |
| | Keeping the possibility to contain the U. S. military advancement by the Russian nuclear forces | China starts developing technology to counteract the alternative ABM |
| | Creation of a pan-European anti-missile shield as a protection from Iran and other countries (if necessary) | China is building up its offensive capacity and deploys its own ABM system |
| | Possibility of unprecedented cooperation between Russia and the US | China enlists more military, develops new strategic ways of conducting warfare |
| | Possibility for Russia and the US to guarantee strategic stability in Europe | Military and political conflict with China |
| | Displaying of Russia's readiness to cooperate with the USA (utilizing media effect) | |
| | Refusal of the US of ABM deployment in the Third Site | |
| | Development of cooperation with the EU, elimination of reasons for military or political conflict between the EU and Russia | |
| | Decline of the arms race | |
| <i>Medium</i> | | |
| Constant monitoring by extraterritorial means over the construction and functioning of the Third Site ABM facilities | Monitoring ABM deployment in the Third Site countries | No significant changes of the situation |
| | Relevant evaluation of physical and geographical conditions for using of the means of destruction and/or containment of Third Site facilities (according to the data received from extraterritorial monitoring systems) | |
| | Readiness to administer a strike against the facilities of the Third Site ABM system | |
| | Preventing nuclear weapon distribution among terrorist groups | Pushing of the third countries into entering alliances with other nuclear unstable or unscrupulous states |
| | Strengthening of international regime of nuclear non-proliferation | |
| | Keeping the current international strategic balance intact | |
| | Review by the US of its plans to create the global ABM system | Development of covert nuclear programmes by third countries |
| | Minimizing the possibility of nuclear strike against the RF by the third countries | Activation of research and development in nuclear missiles by other states |
| | Minimizing the possibilities of third countries to implement nuclear programs | |
| | Preventing the emergence of new nuclear states | |

| <i>Hard</i> | | |
|--|---|---|
| Deployment of weapons (Short range Iskander missiles) within the reach of the Third Site facilities (Kaliningrad region, other regions adjacent to the Third Site) | In the event of threat to national security of Russia, engagement of missiles against the US ABM facilities deployed in Eastern Europe and against other strategic targets in Eastern Europe Confirming Russian resolve in the issues of national security, demonstration of high military capacity and readiness of Russian troops | Open hostility between Russia and the Western world |
| | | Increased tension in the Russia-US relationships, as well as in the relationships between Russia and parties interested in the Third Site ABM system deployment |
| | | NATO military exercises designed to counteract Russian missile threat |
| | | Introducing changes into NATO Strategic Concept and listing Russia among possible enemies |
| | | Introducing changes into the NATO countries' military doctrines |
| | | The launch of a local war of a military conflict supported by the USA with the participation of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and/or Estonia |
| | | Breaking diplomatic ties with the Baltic countries and Poland |
| | | Reinforcing the plans of ABM deployment in Europe |
| | | Adjusting the existing ABM-deployment plan by adding new countries and/or new facilities to the network |
| | | Implementation of space-defence tiers of ABM system |
| | Demonstrative warming up in the relationships with countries critical to the international policy of the United States Convincing the West to drop their ABM programme and thus to avoid the possible military conflict with the Russian Federation Reaffirming Russia as one of the superpowers Creating conditions for launching negotiations on the new ABM treaty or European security | Introducing economic sanctions against Russia by the United States |
| | | Further NATO expansion |
| | | Adjusting the existing ABM-deployment plan by adding new countries and/or new facilities to the network |
| | | Media smear campaign against Russia, information war and the attempts to discredit Russia in the international scene |

| Measures | Potential opportunities | Negative consequences |
|---|--|--|
| Research and Development of new means of destruction (suppression) of the Third Site facilities | Development of more efficient ways to destroy Third Site targets — those with higher precision and lower radiation levels. Simultaneous suppression of a great number of radar stations and other electronic facilities of the Third Site, disruption of the ABM defence system control in the Third Site, disabling automated command transmission systems for means of destructions/homing devices for anti-ballistic missiles, etc. Improving the country's defense potential general | Increased military spending hurting the economy of the country Covert arms race |
| Further development of Russian aerospace defence system | Lowering the threat of aerospace attack from a possible enemy Increasing combat stability of crucial Russian military objects Increasing efficiency of the RF ABM defence system | Covert military and political conflict with the USA Development of defensive and offensive technologies by the USA Aggravation of Russia-US conflict at all levels |
| Development of new means to overcome ABM defence of the USA, of the forms and technologies of their combat applications | Guaranteed destruction of target within the US territory Lowering of efficiency of US ABM defence and increasing of Russian offensive power The possibility of a retaliatory strike by the Russian Federation Implementing nuclear missile dissuasion policy against the United States | Russia-US arms race |

This working group should concentrate on fulfilling the following objectives:

1. Development of negotiation proposals on a number of topics, including, but not limited to: utilization of already existing US and RF ABM defence systems (radar stations in Gabala, etc.), joint participation of the US and Russia in the development of ABM defence.
2. Discussing counter-offers proposed by the US Administration and/or Working Group.
3. Discussing issues arising from the conflicting views of the parties.
4. Keeping the public informed about the negotiations.
5. Evaluation of existing and perspective US and Russian ABM defence systems, forecasting of the outcomes of agreements between Russia and the US and of US ABM defence deployment in Eastern Europe (for Russia).
6. Development of recommendations for military and political leadership of the Russian Federation.
7. Drawing up necessary documents to conduct high-level talks.
8. Drawing up a possible strategic paper on the antiballistic missile defence of the Russian Federation (e.g. Strategic Development of ABM Defence of Russian Federation until 2025).
9. Developing alternative ways of cooperation between Russia and the US regarding ABM defence.

Developing proposals on a new ABM treaty between Russia and the United States. If a joint ABM system is developed, the new treaty should include obligatory clauses defining joint efforts of both countries in this area.

Developing proposals on the new ABM treaty with the USA drawing on the positive experience of the USSR-USA ABM Treaty of 1972. The following provisions (on the agreement of parties) should be included in the treaty:

Each Party undertakes

1. not to give missiles, missile systems, surface-mobile ABM defence systems, seaborne multifunctional combat information control systems, long- and medium-range ABM interceptor missiles and other elements and components of ABM system, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode;
2. not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode;
3. not to create, test or deploy the ABM system or its components on its land, air, space and surface-mobile bases, excluding those already deployed or in the process of deployment;
4. not to create, test or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one ABM at a time; not to modify already deployed launchers to give them such capability; and not to create, test or deploy automatic or self-loading devices designed to speedily reload missile launchers;
5. to keep the existing ABM systems under certain conditions (determine the conditions of conservation of the ABM system during additional talks or keep the conditions of 1972).

Conducting international hearings (in the EU, SCO, CIS, Disarmament Committee of UN General Assembly, CSTO, EurAsEC) on disarmament and missile defence issue with compulsory achievement of joint political agreement. Already on the 15th of June 2011, during the anniversary SCO summit in Astana, the participants of the summit adopted the Astana Declaration, in which the leaders of the SCO states (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizia) have condemned US plans of global ABM defence system deployment: «The member states believe that the unilateral and unrestricted build-up of a missile defence capability by one state or a group of countries can hurt strategic stability and international security» [9]. In his interview, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, said that the criticism is directed not only against the deployment of Euro-ABM, but against the “global ABM system that is being deployed by the USA all over the world, even in South-East Asia” [17].

Conducting negotiations with Iran on the non-proliferation of nuclear materials in military purposes, and on the inadmissibility of development of long-range nuclear missiles, on the possibility of further IAEA control over the nuclear programme implemented by Iran, on the necessity to fight nuclear terrorism and on the necessity to control the spread of missile technologies and to join the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Coordinating the ABM defence issue with the key issues of disarmament and non-proliferation across the world and in Europe will complement the already existing political measures. The possibility to refuse further disarmament and non-proliferation, and the possibility of Russian exit from the SNF-3 Treaty (Nov 23, 2011) was underlined by the President of the Russian Federation in his statement on the Euro-ABM deployment in Europe [5].

Convincing Eastern European Countries (Romania, Poland and Czech Republic) that there is a possibility of the following negative effects of the US ABM defence system deployment (to be achieved through public media, diplomatic, private and political channels of influence):

- cooling down in political and economic relationships with Russia;
- cooling down of relationships with the states involved in the nuclear debate;
- discord within the EU, change of EU authority and introduction of new Members;
- emergence of strategic secret objects that will disrupt the relaxed European lifestyle;
- increased US military contingent in the Third Site states;
- involvement in the arms race between the USA and Russia with possible additions of third countries;
- destruction of targets, including missile attacks, in their territory;
- radioactive poisoning of the territory after such attacks.

We also call for support (media and financial support) of NGOs, unions, influential individuals who used to take prominent positions in the governments of Third Site countries, public intellectuals, and regular citizens who wish to protest the ABM deployment plans. Since some of the Eastern European countries also lie in Central Europe (Poland, Romania, Czech Republic), their general attitude and reaction can greatly influence the geopolitical situation, preferably in the interests of Russian Federation.

Introduction of the stipulation on possibility of a preventive strike (possibly with battle field nuclear weapons) on the objects of the 3rd missile launching area of the US ABM Defence into the Russian Federation Military Doctrine. At present The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010, reserves the right for Russia “to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat” [3]. Thereat among the main external military threats it counts “the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc”, as well as “the creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems” [3]. At the same time, “the Russian Federation's military policy is aimed at preventing an arms race, deterring and preventing military conflicts, and improving <...> means of attack for the purpose of defending and safeguarding the security of the Russian Federation and also the interests of its allies” [3]. Besides, Russia's paramount task is preventing a nuclear military conflict, and among the main goals in preventing and deterring military conflicts it holds “creating mechanisms for the regulation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the sphere of missile defence” [3].

Seeking coalition with states holding similar views on the 3rd missile launching area of the US ABM Defence (China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) and cooperation at the international scene. Extending the coalition is possible through states that hold neutral (or indifferent) views on the said question or who have not yet defined their views. On October 4, 2011 it was reported that Russia and the Ukraine held negotiations on the cooperative missile shield system [16]. Head of the Ukrainian Mission in NATO, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary Igor Dolgov said that the Ukraine would participate in the NATO ABM Defence only if Russia joined it [18].

Depending on the political situation the policies also include Russia's dismissal, consent or partial consent with the US proposals concerning the ABM.

Development of the military technical proposals to create an alternation ABM variant with the Russian Federation Armed Forces taking the lead:

- the US ABM system utilizing information from Russian missile attack warning facilities (the radar locator station in Gabala (Azerbaijan) and other areas) on the situation with possible nuclear missile attack forces;

- deployment of the Russian Federation ABM system aerospace target weapons in the southern borderline areas of Russia and other missile threat directions;

— forming a joined interface for the information management systems of Russia and the US ABM Defence.

At the Lisbon Summit that took place in November 2010 Russia and the US agreed to continue discussing future cooperation on ABM Defence. Russia proposed to create a sectoral ABM defence system, according to which missiles that would fly over Russia towards NATO members would be exterminated by the Russian forces. In its turn NATO must destroy missiles traversing territories of NATO members and aimed at Russian facilities. Besides, the parties will not aim their ABM facilities at each other and deploy them at the shared borders [4]. However, at the meeting of the Russian President with NATO administration held in July 2011 in Sochi and the visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov in Washington this idea was rejected. And at the Russia — NATO Council session held on December 8, 2011 the parties did not achieve any progress on this issue. The next NATO summit session will take place in May 2012 in Chicago. Its results may define the international situation.

Constant monitoring by extraterritorial surveillance facilities (space facilities for Earth's remote probing, like "Resurs-DK") of the Third Site of the US ABM Defence system facilities, both functioning as well as being under construction), and updating their location and creating their 2D images to input into the fire weapons guidance system. "Resurs-DK" makes it possible to obtain detailed images of the facilities and transmit the information through a radio channel to the Earth.

Precluding supplies of equipment and technologies for manufacturing nuclear missile weapons in the third countries. Russia may join in sanctions against Iran and Democratic People's Republic of Korea and discontinue its peaceful programme.

Deployment of means of destruction (short-range missiles "Iskander") within reach of the 3rd missile launching area of the US ABM Defence system (Kaliningrad region, Russian Federation regions bordering on the Third Site) that will not demand any substantial expenses and will take the form of an asymmetrical response. In 2008 in his first Address to the Federal Assembly the Russian President announced a possibility of installing "Iskander" missiles in the Kaliningrad region if need there be [13]. On the 23rd of November, 2011 Dmitry Medvedev in his special address to the citizens of the Russian Federation confirmed the intention to deploy the "Iskander" missile complex in the Kaliningrad region and strike systems in the western and southern areas of Russia if necessary [5]. The Russian President's allegation to deploy operational "Iskander" and making radar locator stations in Kaliningrad operational provoked a negative response from the Baltic States. Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius reassured Russia of NATO ABM Defence system not being targeted at Russia and mentioned that "it must be taken seriously, but... to assure Russia that it should not act so beligerently, we must... together with the NATO partners"[14]. At the same time "Latvian Defence Minister Artis Pabriks asked the authorities of the Latvian National Defence Forces to estimate Medvedev words "from the standpoint of the military threat" [14].

Research and Development of new means of destruction (suppression) of the Third Site facilities (for example, precision weapons, radioelectronic countermeasures means, aerospace jamming etc.). This will probably require introducing corrections into the Government military contract. In 2009—2010 the Ministry of Defence already contracted research and development works on the creation of complex specimens for the Strategic Missile Forces and Aerospace Forces; these works can be financed from the military spending budget under the Federal Armament Programme for 2011—2020 [2]. In the above-mentioned Presidential Address (Nov. 23, 2011), Dmitry Medvedev tasked the Military Forces of the Russian Federation with “developing measures ensuring the destruction of control and information-transfer system within the ABM defence, should such need ever arise” [5].

Further development of the Russian aerospace defence system (data transmission and strike capacity, methods and forms of overcoming ABM, etc.) within the framework of the new strategic partnership between the Russian Military Forces and its Aerospace Forces. As of December, 2011, the troops of the new Aerospace Defence Forces, created in accordance with the Presidential decree, took up their duty. Shortly before that, another Presidential decree (of Nov. 29th, 2011) introduced the system of missile attack detection, a radar location station “Voronezh DM” into the military facilities of the Kaliningrad region [6]. According to Dmitry Medvedev, Aerospace Forces will help to increase the protection of strategic nuclear objects [5]. “From the military and geopolitical standpoint, the aerospace defence is a valuable tool of keeping geopolitical balance in the modern world. From the strategic standpoint, it is the main guarantee of ensuring that the President of Russian Federation — and Supreme Commander-in-Chief — receives correct and relevant information about the airspace situation and is thus able to make strategic decisions” [8, c. 46].

Development of new means to overcome the ABM defence of the USA, of the forms and technologies of their combat applications. “Bulava ICBM”, for example, carried by the nuclear submarines, has the launching radius of 8000 km, and its main advantage is that it contains individual nuclear maneuvering homing devices that are able to change the height and trajectory of the flight [1]. In his November Address, Dmitry Medvedev underlined that the strategic nuclear missile available to the Russian Military Forces and Strategic Missile Forces “will be equipped with the top means of overcoming ABM defence and with new, highly efficient warheads” [5].

In this article we propose a number of development scenarios for Russian response to the ABM system deployment — each of those scenarios can be triggered and put into action depending on the actual steps implemented by the US Administration.

References

1. Ballisticheskaja raketa «Bulava»: tehicheskie harakteristiki. Spravka [Ballistic missile «Bulava»: technical specifications. Reference], *RIA Novosti*, available at: <http://ria.ru/spravka/20100224/210651991.html> (accessed 24 September 2011).
2. V novoj Gosudarstvennoj programme vooruzhenija prioritet ot dan vysokotekhnologichnym obrazcam [The new state arms program gives priority to the high-tech designs], *Nacional'naja oborona* [National defence], available at: <http://www.>

oborona. ru/includes/periodics/maintheme/2011/0314/21345724/detail. shtml (accessed 24 September 2011).

3. Voennaja doktrina Rossijskoj Federacii [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], *Oficial'nyj sajt Prezidenta Rossii* [Official site of President of Russia], available at: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461 (accessed 28 June 2011).

4. Gabuev, A. 2011, Vash sektor vozle Russia [Your sector near Russia], *Kommersant*, 16 July, p. 1—2.

5. Zajavlenie Prezidenta v svjazi s situaciej, kotoraja slozhilas' vokrug sistemy PRO stran NATO v Evrope [Statement by the President in connection with the situation that has developed around NATO missile defence system in Europe], *Oficial'nyj sajt Prezidenta Rossii* [Official site of President of Russia], available at: <http://kremlin.ru/news/13637> (accessed 23 September 2011).

6. Kaliningradszkaja RLS zastupila na boevoe dezhurstvo [Kaliningrad radar was put into combat duty], *Lenta. ru*, available at: <http://www.lenta.ru/news/2011/11/29/station/> (accessed 30 September 2011).

7. Kosov, Ju. V. 2009, Osobennosti geopoliticheskikh processov v Central'noj Evrope [Features geopolitical processes in Central Europe], *Upravlencheskoe konsul'tirovanie* [Management consulting], no. 3, p. 91—97.

8. Kucherjavij, M. M. 2008, Geopoliticheskie protivorechija mezhdru Rossiej i Zapadom v vozdušno-kosmicheskoj sfere [Geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West in the aerospace field], *Upravlencheskoe konsul'tirovanie* [Management consulting], no. 4, p. 43—49.

9. Lidery ShOS: narawivanie PRO uzakoj gruppoy stran podryvaet stabil'nost' [Leaders of SCO defence build-up a small group of countries undermines the stability of], *RIA Novosti*, available at: http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20110615/388620871.html (accessed 20 July 2011).

10. Lukianov, F. 2005, SShA vozvodjat raketnyj zabor vokrug Rossii i radi jeto go tovy zakopat' svoe oruzhie v Pol'she [U.S. missile erecting a fence around Russia, and for this ready to bury their weapons in Poland], *Rossijskaja gazeta* [The Russian newspaper], 19 January, p. 8.

11. NATO poobewalo zapustit' sistemu EvroPRO v 2018 godu [NATO has promised to run a European missile defence system in 2018], *KM. RU*, available at: <http://www.km.ru/v-mire/2011/10/05/voenno-politicheskii-blok-nato/nato-poobeshchalo-zapustit-sistemu-evropro-v-2018-g> (accessed 6 September 2011).

12. Oleg Ostapenko: potencial VKO budet postojanno narawivat'sja [Oleg Ostapenko: potential ASD will continue to grow], *Vesti. Ru*, available at: <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=649217&cid=7> (accessed 2 September 2011).

13. Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniju Rossijskoj Federacii 5 nojabrja 2008 goda [Address to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation, November 5, 2008], *Oficial'nyj sajt Prezidenta Rossii* [Official site of President of Russia], available at: http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/11/05/1349_type63372type63374type63381type82634_208749.shtml (accessed 22 September 2011).

14. Prem'er Litvy: My dolzhny ubedit' Rossiju ne vesti sebja voinstvenno [Lithuanian Prime Minister: We have to persuade Russia not to behave aggressively], *NewsBalt*, available at: <http://newsbalt.ru/detail/?ID=2433> (accessed 9 September 2011).

15. Romanec, I. 2007, Tretij pozicionnyj rajon PRO SShA: prednaznachenie — mnimoe i real'noe [A third missile defence U.S. mission — real and imaginary], *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* [Foreign Military Review], no. 7, p. 1—5.

16. Rossiya i Ukraina vedut peregovory po sovmestnoj sisteme PRO [Russia and Ukraine are negotiating a joint missile defence system], *RIA Novosti*, available at: <http://ria.ru/world/20111004/449045269.html> (accessed 4 September 2011).

17. Sammit ShOS ukazyvaet na usilenie mezhdunarodnoj naprjazhennosti [The SCO summit points to increased international tensions], *inoSMI. Ru*, available at: <http://www.inosmi.ru/world/20110622/171055975.html> (accessed 20 July 2011).

18. Ukraina zainteresovalas' Evropejskoj sistemoj PRO [Ukraine is interested in European missile defence system], *KM. RU*, available at: <http://www.km.ru/ukraina/2011/10/06/voenno-politicheskii-blok-nato/ukraina-zainteresovalas-evropeiskoi-sistemoi-pro> (accessed 9 September 2011).

19. Insidepolitics. Transcript: President Bush speech on missile, *CNN.com*, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/05/01/bush.missile.trans> (accessed 18 September 2011).

About the authors

Prof. Igor M. Lyovkin, North-West Institute of Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, full member of the Academy of Military Sciences.

E-mail: lev.kin@yandex.ru

Valeria I. Shatskaya, student, North-West Institute of Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

E-mail: tomasik-90@mail.Ru